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THE MODERN AMERICAN CASES ARISING OUT
OF TRADE AND LABOR DISPUTES."
A trader or laborer may harm other traders or laborers in
several ways. If the harm is due to direct violence I or
false statement, the law has no hesitation in holding the
person responsible liable in damages to the injured person.
But a man may do harm to another's trade or business, not
only by violence or misrepresentation, but by merely abstaining from dealing with him or by inducing his customers
or employees to leave him or his employer to discharge
him. The strike, the lockout, and the boycott are the most
prominent examples of acts of this class producing harm.
The strike is an agreement between two or more persons
not to deal in a business way with a third. A labor strike
'The English cases are treated by the writer in an article entitled
"Some Leading English Cases on Trade and Labor Disputes," 51 Am.
LAw REG. 125, March, 1903.

*Under the head of direct violence may be included those cases in
which a plaintiff has been interrupted in the exercise of his profession

or business by noisy demonstrations intended to interrupt, but not
necessarily threatening him with personal violence-as hissing an actor

at a theatre, as in Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 13 L. J. C. P. 34, 1843,
or frightening wild fowl who were approaching the plaintiff's decoy,
as in Keeble v. Hickeringill, xi East. 574, note, and Carrington v.

Taylor, ix East. 571, i8oq.
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occurs where the employees of a person or corporation leave
their employment in a body and refuse to return until their
wishes are complied with. But there is also the employer's
strike and a trade strike. The employer's strike is usually
termed a lockout or agreement to black list. Several employers agree to discharge their hands until they are willing
to work on certain terms, or agree not to employ a person
who as the employee of any one of them has broken a rule
of conduct which the employers desire their employees to
observe. The trade strike is where several traders agree
together to refuse to deal with another trader.
The boycott is economic pressure brought to bear on
those who deal, or are about to deal, in a business way with
a third person to prevent them from dealing with such third
person. There are always three persons or classes of persons
in a boycott-the person or persons who persuade, those
whom they persuade, and the person boycotted. The
method of persuasion used is always the threat of business
harm, usually couched in the formula: If you deal with A,
we won't deal with you. One man may be "persuaded"
not to deal with another, not only by economic pressure,
but by violence or the threat of violence to person or
property. Or, the method of "persuasion" may be by mere
argument, or by the offer of money or money's worth.
None of these are true boycotts. As classes of acts which
interfere in the business relations of others they have not
received a distinctive name.
:The purpose of this article is to show the development
in this country of the law of tort as applied to the strike,
the boycott, and the persuasion of third persons by argument or by violence or by the offer of money not to deal
with another. The method which we shall pursue will be
to treat the various legal questions in the order in which our
courts have been called upon to deal with them.8
'As the writer believes that the old common-law action for enticing

servants has had no influence on the development of the modern law as
affecting the subject of this article, he has omitted all discussion of the

few modern cases discussing this action. Some modem cases of this
class occasionally cited in the trade and labor cases are Haskins v.
Royster, 7o N. C. 6oi, 1874; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456, x876.
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In 1854 the case of Hunt v. Simonds 4 came before the
Supreme Court of Missouri. It raised the question of the
legality, from the point of view of private law, of what we
have called the trade strike, or an agreement between two or
more traders, who have been dealing with a third, to discontinue dealing with him. The plaintiff had been the
owner and captain of a steamboat. He alleged that the
defendants, who were the officers of various insurance companies, combined, confederated, and conspired wilfully and
maliciously to injure him, and, with the intent of effecting
their object, refused, without cause, to take any insurance
upon his boat, whereby he was deprived of all benefit from
his occupation, and was compelled to sell his boat and abandon his business. The defendants demurred, the court sustained the demurrer, and the Supreme Court confirmed this
action. The case stands for the proposition that two or
more traders, not being under any contract to continue to
deal with a third trader, may combine to refuse to deal with
him, for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all,
without being liable for any harm which may result to such
third trader. The court rests its decision on two propositions: First, that a man has an absolute right to deal or
not to deal with another as he pleases. 5 Second, that what
one man has an absolute right to do two or more men have
a right to "combine" or agree together to do;6 in other
words, that in our civil, as distinguished from our criminal
law, there is no such thing as liability for conspiracy to
harm unless the harm, considered apart from the conspiracy,
is a legal injury. This last proposition has been followed
in a number of cases of the class which we are considering. 7
z9 Mo. 583, 1854.
" It is obviously the right of every citizen to deal or refuse to deal
with any other citizen, and no person has ever thought himself entitled
to complain in a court of justice of a refusal to deal with him, except
in some cases where, by reason of the public character which the party
sustains, there rests upon him the legal obligation to deal and contract
with others."
ePages 587, 588.
Randall v. Hazelton, 94 Mass. 412, x866; Bowven v. Matheson, 96
Mass. 499, z867, 5o2; Van Horn v. Vtan Horn, 52 N. J. L. 284, 189o, 286;
Moores v. Bricklayers' Union, 23 Ohio Law Bul. 48, i8go, Ss; Del v.
Winfree, 8o Tex. 400, 1891, 404; Bohn Mnf. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223,
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The first proposition assumes that some rights are absolute; that is, may be exercised under all circumstances and
from any motive without the actor being liable for the
resulting harm. From this assumption it does not necessarily follow that there may not be some rights which are
not absolute. There may still be acts for the harmful results
of which the actor may or may not be liable according to
the circumstances under which, or the motive with which,
they were performed. The court in this case, however, by
assuming that if the plaintiff was to recover, the defendant's
act must be shown to be wrongful, apparently assumes that
all rights recognized by law are absolute rights8 In short,
the court assumes that acts are either rightful or wrongful
and only those falling under the latter class can be a ground
of civil action. 9 The case of Hunt v. Simonds has been
followed in Bowen v. Matheson 10 and Bohn Manufacturing
Company v. Hollis." In the
latter case the defendants were
1
1893, 234; Graham v. St. Charles St. Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. 2r4, z895, 216;
Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., x24 Fed. 246, 1903, 248. See
apparently contra Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. 40, 1893, affirmed, sub non
Hagan v. Blindell, 56 Fed. 696, C. C. A. x893; Eider v. Whitesides, 72
Fed. 724, 1895. The cases contra arose in the Circuit Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. Compare Boutwell v. Mar, 71 Vt. x,
1899, s. c.; 42 AtL 6o7, 6og. In Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 39o, 3879,
a case very badly reported, the court appear to interpret the principle
that damage, not conspiracy, is the gist of the action where a number
of persons have conspired to injure another, as meaning that if A et aL
conspire to harm B and harm results, that B has an action against A
et al. irrespective of the purpose of A et al. or the method by which the
harm was inflicted. This amounts to an assertion that all conspiracies
to harm resulting in harm are actionable.
. Note argument ig Mo. page 586, and the statement, page 589, to the
effect that "The important allegation, in determining whether this
action will lie, is that vhich states the acts of the defendants, which
were intended to effect their object."
'This view of legal' rights and legal wrongs, which leads to the
assumption that no man is liable for his acts until they are shown to be
in themselves wrongful, has been taken in the trade and labor cases:
By Chapman, J., in Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. 499, 1867, 502, et seq.;
by Sage, J., in Casey v. Cincinnati Typo. Union, 45 Fed. 135, x89r, 143.
See also Matthews v. Shankland, 56 N. Y. Supl. 123, 1898, 128. In accord with the proposition that one man, irrespective of his purpose,
has an absolute righf to refuse to deal with qnother, see the language
used in the following cases: Dels v. Winfree, 8o Tex. 4oo, x891, 404;
Graham v. St. Charles St. Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. 214, z895. See also
cases cited infra, note. But see Mattison v. Lake Shore and M. S. Ry.
CO.,
Ohio Dec., Sup. and C. P. 526, x895.
a
Mass. 499, 1867, discussed infra on another point.
' 54 Minn. 223, r893.
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members of an association known as the Northwestern Lumbermen's Association, the membership of which embraced
about one-half the retail lumber dealers in Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. They resolved that if
any wholesale dealer sold directly to a consumer in a territory in which a member of the association did business and
refused on demand to pay to the association a commission of
ten per cent. on such sale, the secretary should notify each
member not to deal with said wholesaler, and thereafter any
member who did deal with him would be expelled from the
association. The Bohn Manufacturing Company, a wholesale lumber company, sold directly to a consumer against
the above-mentioned rule and refused to pay the commission
demanded. They then asked the court to restrain the officers
of the association from sending out notices to the members
notifying them not to deal with the plaintiff or any other
matter that might tend to injure the plaintiff's trade or
business. The court on appeal dissolved the temporary
injunction granted, not on the ground that a court of equity
being unable to act effectively would not act at all, but on
the broad ground that the defendants in doing what they
did, though injuring the plaintiff, were acting within their
legal rights. The opinion of Justice Mitchell in this case
goes as far as the decision in Hunt v. Simonds in holding
that a trade strike is legal for any purpose. The facts of the
two cases, however, may be distinguished. In the Minnesota case, at least, the ultimate purpose of the defendants
in doing what they did was to advance their own interests
by keeping the wholesaler out of the retail market, while
the demurrer in Hunt v. Simonds admits that the purpose
of the defendants in that case was merely to enjoy the ruin
of the plaintiff's business.12
'Russell v. New York Produce Exchange, 58 N. Y. Supl. 842, 1899
is an example of a case belonging to the same class as Bohn Mnf. Co. v.
Hollis, in which the facts were more strongly in favor of the defendants.
The members of a stock exchange resolved that they would not allow
their members to buy or sell on the exchange for any person who was
guilty of practices which the members of the association regarded as
inimical to their interests. The officers of the association, acting under
the rules of the association, posted the plaintiffs on the floor of the
exchange as having been guilty of the prohibited nractices. The court

TRADE AND LABOR DISPUTES.

In the cases just discussed the defendants refused to deal
with the plaintiff. In the next case, Orr v. Home Mutual
Insurance Company,1" the defendants refused to have any
business relations with anyone who did business with the
plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged in his petition that he was a
master of a steamboat on the Red River, and that the defendants, certain insurance companies, had maliciously combined to refuse to insure anything or any steamer on which
the plaintiff was employed, and that by reason of this action
on the part of the defendants the owner of the vessel discharged him. The defendants' contention that the plaintiff's
petition showed no cause of action was sustained by the
court on the ground that the defendants had the absolute
right under all circumstances and from whatever motive to
refuse to insure a boat or its cargo. Bowen v. Matheson,14 the Massachusetts decisi6n before mentioned, is in
accord with this case. The plaintiff kept a seamen's boarding-house. The defendants were also.keepers of seamen's
boarding-houses and members of the "Seamen's Mutual
Benefit Association." The rules of the association provided that the members should use their best endeavors to
prevent any seaman boarding with them from shipping in
any vessel where any of the crew were shipped from a house
not in good standing with the association, and that any
members of the association knowingly shipping any of their
boarders on vessels having men shipped from houses not
in good standing should be fined five dollars for each man
shipped. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, unlawfully and maliciously conspiring to injure him in his business, "took their men out of ships because the plaintiff's
refused to restrain by injunction this action of the officers of the association on the ground that it was not for an outsider to complain of the
rules of the association. It would appear that the case decides that two
or more persons acting as brokers could agree together that they would
not represent in transactions with each other certain persons when the
rules by which the obnoxious persons were determined were primarily
designed, not for the injury of the persons excluded, but for the benefit
of the brokers. See, also, Collins v. American News Co., 34 Misc. 26o,
N. Y. Sup. igox.
,a
12

La Ann.

255,

1857.

"96 Mass. 499, 1867.
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men were in the same," and thus prevented him from
getting seamen as boarders. 15 The defendants demurred,
and the court sustained the demurrer. The demurrer in
effect admitted that the defendants for their own private
good and ends had said to the owners of vessels: "You
have your choice. Take men from our houses or from the
plaintiff's house, but you cannot deal with us and with the
plaintiff." It would also appear that the demurrer admitted
that the customers of the plaintiff ceased dealing with him
because of these threats. Here, as in the earlier Louisiana
case, we have all the elements of a boycott. There was,
however, no attempt on the part of the defendants to interfere with any existing contract between the plaintiff and
his customers. The business or economic pressure was
brought against those who otherwise would have dealt
with the plaintiff. On the other hand, the demurrer would
seem to be an admission that the purpose of the defendants
was not necessarily their own advancement, but might
have been a mere desire to harm the plaintiff. The court,
however, apparently treats the case as involving a discussion
of the limits of fair trade competition, thereby assuming
that the defendants were acting for their own interests, and
not for the purely malicious purpose of injuring the plaintiff.
The case stands for the proposition that the person boycotted
has no civil action for the harm done him, at least in the
case where both plaintiff and defendants are traders, and
the defendants' motive was self-advancement. Irrespective
of the decision, the opinion itself, which is written by Justice
Chapman, is an extreme example of that method of examining a doubtful question of tort which consists in separating
each act of the defendant from the surrounding circumstances and the purpose of the actors and asking, in relation
to an act so separated, "Had the defendant a right to do this
act?"'1 Furthermore, there is the practical assumption that,
as I have a right to refuse to have business dealings with
another, unless I am bound to him by contract, I can place
Page 5o2.

" See supra, note 8.
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any condition on my dealing with him that I please, provided
I do not ask him to commit a tort or breach of contract,
without any possibility of becoming liable to him or anyone else.' 7 The decision in Bowen v. Matheson has been8
followed in at least two American and one Scottish case.'
In the American cases, Macauley v. Tierney and Transportation Company v. Standard Oil Company, and in Lord
Lindley's approval of the Scottish case, in the celebrated
case of Quinn v. Leathem, the theory given is different
from that in Bowen v. Matheson. The inference, that as
I have a right to refuse to have business dealings with
another, I can therefore place any conditions on dealing
with him which I see fit, no matter how injurious those
conditions may be to a third person, without being liable
to such third person, is denied. It is admitted that a trade
boycott for a malicious purpose may be actionable, but the
fact that in the cases cited the boycott was instituted by the
defendants for their own business advancement is regarded
as a legal justification for their act. 19 On the other hand,
in two other American cases the plaintiff has been allowed to
'It is interesting to compare with this modern case the old case of the
Abbot of Lilleshall in Pub. of Sel. Soc. Select Pleas of the Crown, vol. x,
page iiS, a case in the year x221, where the Abbot brought an action
against the bailiffs of Shrewsbury because they made a proclamation
that anyone who sold to the Abbot should forfeit ten shillings. The
plaintiff was put to his law.
" Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255, 1895; Transportation Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 6rxi, 19o2; Scottish Co-operative Society v.
Glasgow Fleshers'Asso., 35 Scott, L. R. 645, 189& The last case was
approved by Lord Lindley in Quinn v. Leathen (i9ox), A. C. 495, 539.
The facts of Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor,L. R. 23 Q. B. 598, i89g, s. c.
(x892), A. C. 25, may be said to ivolve a trade boycott. The plaintiff
failed to recover.
29The

See, however, 51 Ame. LAw Ria., page 131.

theory of these cases will be discussed in connection with the
decision of Walker v. Cronin, infra.
In accordance with the position that a trade boycott for a malicious
purpose, as for satisfying a grudge against the plaintiff, gives him a
good cause of action, see International and Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Greenwood, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 1893; Graham v. St. Charles
St. Ry.
Co., 47 La. Ann. 214, 1895; Transportation Co. v. Oil Co., 5o V. Va.
6x1, i9o2; Webb v. Drake, 52 La. Ann. 29o, 1899. Contra, Payne v. The
Western & At. Ry. Co., x3 Lea. 5o7 Tenn., 1884. In Cote v. Murphy,
i59 Pa. 420, 1894, the purpose of the defendants seems to have beer

to punish the plaintiff, who was an employer of labor, for not standing
by the defendants during a general strike in the trade, but the plaintiff
failed, in the opinion of the court, to show damage.
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secure an injunction to restrain a trade boycott, though the
purpose of the defendants was to advance their own business
interest. In the first of these cases, Jackson v. Stanhield,20
the facts are identical with Bohn Manufacturing Company
v. Hollis,21 except that the action was brought by a consumer, or rather retailer, of lumber, who was not a member
of the Lumbermen's Association, against the association
for threatening the manufacturers with a withdrawal of
their custom if they sold to the pldntiff. The court held
that the plaintiff could not only recover for his loss of business, but was entitled to an injunction against the continuation of the boycott. The case of Walsh v. Association of
Master Plumbers22 is identical with Macauley v. Tierney
just referred to. Both cases arose out of the attempt of the
Association of Master Plumbers to drive out of business
all master plumbers who did not join their association by
refusing to buy supplies from any manufacturer who sold
to a master plumber not a member of the association. In
both cases the plaintiff was a master plumber not a member
of the association, who because of the boycott was unable to
obtain plumbing supplies from the manufacturers. As
stated, the Rhode Island Court came to the conclusion that
the action of the association was not a civil wrong to the
plaintiff. The Court of Appeals of Missouri reached an
opposite conclusion. The result is that at the present time
there is a conflict of authority in regard to a boycott of one
trader by several other traders, some cases holding the boycotters liable for the harm resulting from the boycott, though
their purpose was self-advancement, others holding that the
person harmed cannot recover.
Since the decision in Bowen v. Matheson, the drift of
authority has been against the extreme position which is
apparently taken by Justice Chapman in that case-namely,
that one man may, with a purely malicious desire to harm
another, say to a third, "If you deal with that other I will
not deal with you," without being liable to the other for the
137 Ind. 5,
1893.
54 Minn. 223, 1893.
97 Mo. App. 280, i902, s. C., 71 S. W. 455.
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resulting harm. Indeed, Justice Chapman himself in the next
trade and labor case coming before his court abandons the
assumption of the absolute right to do an act irrespective of
its consequence, or the purpose of the actor, on which assumption his opinion in Bowen v. Matheson.appears to have been
based.
The case referred to is Carew v. Rutherford.23 The
plaintiff was a master stone-cutter. His laborers were members of a union. A rule of this union provided that the master
stone-cutters should not send their work out of the state.
The plaintiff violated this rule. The president of the union,
who was his foreman, came to him and said that the union
had voted, in view of this violation of its rules, that he should
pay a fine of five hundred dollars to the union. He refused
to do this and his men went out on strike. Subsequently the
president and other members of the union told him that no
member of their union would be allowed to work in his shop
if he refused to pay the money demanded. As he had important contracts on hand and unfinished, he paid the money
demanded to one Wagner, the treasurer of the union. The
plaintiff sued the defendants, including the president, treasurer, and members of the union, as an unincorporated associtation, in contract with an alternative count in tort. The
trial judge thought that the facts given did not constitute
a cause of action. On appeal, the count in tort was sustained. It will be noted that the act of which the plaintiff
complained was the demand by the defendants that he should
pay money as a prerequisite to their returning to work. The
plaintiff was under no obligations to pay the money. The
defendants did not threaten him with physical harm either to
his person or his property. The defendants, however, did
take advantage of the circumstance that the plaintiff was in
need of men to complete his contracts with third persons, and
of the fact that their organization included most of the
skilled workmen in the trade, to bring economic pressure, or
a threat of practical business loss, unless the money was paid.
Their purpose, as far as the purpose is made clear by the
23

io6 Mass. i, x87o.
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facts as found by the trial judge, was partly to increase the
money in the treasury of the association, and partly to punish
the plaintiff for violating a rule of their association, and
through such punishment to deter him and others from again
violating the rule, the rule itself having been adopted because
the members of the union thought it would advance their interests as laborers. From the point of view of Chief-Justice
Chapman, who wrote the opinion, the essential fact making
the defendants' act illegal was the fact that they had taken
advantage of the circumstances to force the plaintiff to pay
them money to avoid a still greater business loss. 24 Under
this view it may be stated that the court thought that it is
illegal to obtain money from another, which that other does
not owe, by a threat of business harm, and the mere fact that
the threat takes the form of a refusal to work until the
money is paid, the threatener not being under contract to
work, is immaterial. The cases in the note are sufficient to
show that until again discussed and affirmed the case and the
on which it rests are doubtful. 25
proposition
It is curious to note that the opinion of
Justice Chapman
in Carew v. Rutherford illustrates a radically different way
of approaching a doubtful question of alleged tort than that
shown by his opinion in Bowen v. Matheson. Instead of the
"Page

Ix.

'The facts in Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Holls, 54 Minn. 223,
x893, which are detailed in the text, supra, show that the court did
not think it illegal for a number of retail lumber merchants to refuse to buy lumber from a wholesale merchant until the wholesale
merchant paid "he association a sum of money he did not owe them.
On the other hapd, in Schulten v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 96 Ky. 224,
x894, it was held that a declaration which stated that the defendants
refused to sell to the plaintiff beer until he had paid one of their number
a sum of money, though the declaration alleged harm to the plaintiff's
business, was only insufficient because the plaintiff did not allege that
he did not owe the money. Had he so alleged the decision would have
been in accord with Carew v. Rutherford. The principle that if the
money is due to one member of an association of business persons the
members of the association may lawfully agree not to sell to the debtor
until he pays the debt was applied in Brewster v. Miller's Sons, ig Ky.
Law. Rep. 593, 1897. The case of Ryan v. Burger & Hower Brewing
Co., i3 N. Y. Supl. 66, x8gi, in which the facts on which the action is
based are nearly identical with Schulten v. BavarianBrewing Co., supra,
seems to have been decided on a question of misrepresentation. Quare:
Whether several persons could refuse to furnish A with goods until he
paid B a debt due B, B having nothing to do with the agreement?
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separation of the act causing the harm from the surrounding
circumstances of the case with a view of determining its
inherent legal character, we have an apparently legal actthe refusal to work until a sum of money is paid-becoming
illegal because of the surrounding circumstances. It is perhaps needless to point out that the different results reached
in the two cases were probably due to this difference in the
method pursued. 26 Again he assumes exactly what in the
former case he would seem to deny-namely, that a defendant
is at least to be considered prima fade liable for any harm to
the plaintiff which he has knowingly caused. After citing
the early examples given in Bacon's Abridgment of tortious
interference in business, as where one disturbs my workmen
with threats of personal injury, or menaces my tenants " per
quod they depart from their terms," he says: "The illustrations given in former times relate to such methods of doing
injury to others as were then practised and to the kinds of
remedy then existing. But as new methods of doing injury
to others are invented in modern times, the same principles
must be applied to them, in order that peaceable citizens may
be protected from being disturbed in the enjoyment of their
27
rights and privileges."
The case of Walker v. Cronin 28 further illustrates and
explains the theory that a man who knowingly inflicts
harm on another must at least show some reason why he
should not be held liable for that harm. There were three
counts in the plaintiff's declaration. Two were for wilfully persuading those under contract to work for the plaintiff to break their contracts. The court sustains these counts,
not because of any peculiarity in the relatioii of master
and servant, but because a legal right derived from the contract was alleged to be violated as a result of the defendant's
act.2 ' The plaintiff's counts did not state the method of persuasion used, whether it was by argument, economic pressure,
In note 49, infra, where the method of approaching a question of
tort followed by Justice Chapman in Carew v. Rutherford produced,
in a case like Bowen v. Matheson, a result favorable to the plaititiff.
'Page

ii.

o7 Mass.
SPage
567. 555, x871.
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or threat of violence. The decision therefore stands for the
proposition that to wilfully cause another to break an obligation to a third person gives the third a right of action, not
only against the person who broke the contract, but also
against the person who caused him to do so. This proposition, which had in effect been already announced in England
in the celebrated case of Lumley v. Gye,30 has been applied
in the American trade and labor cases since Walker v.
Cronin.3 '
In one case, Jersey City PrintingCompany v. Cassidy,"'
a court of equity has restrained defendants from in any
manner persuading a third person to break his contract with
the plaintiff.3 s This, at least on its face, restrains persuasion by argument. Walker v. Cronin held that such
persuasion is prima facie a civil wrong, but the wisdom
of extending the power of a court of equity to restrain
argument may be seriously doubted. If the method of
persuasion used to induce the third person to break the
contract is the offer of money or other economic advantage,
economic pressure, or violence, the court of equity has without hesitation issued its restraining order.3 4
W2 E. and B. 216, 1853. Followed in Bowen v. Hall, L.P, 6 Q. B. D.
333, 1881, and Tempeton v. Russell (1893), r Q. B. 715.
" Accord: Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill.
6o8, x898. A futiori a conspiracy to write the officers of a company with whom the plaintiff has a

contract to induce such officers so to act as to effect a practical breach
of the contract of the company with the plaintiff is actionable if damage
to the plaintiff result. Angle v. Chicago and St. Paul Ry. Co., 1s1 U.
S. 1, 1893. Compare Gatzow v. Buening, xo6 Wis. x,Igoo.
63 N. J. Eq. 759, 1902.

:See also the wording of the injunction issued by Justice Holmes in

Vegelahn v. Guntner, x67 Mass. 92, 1896, 96.

he offer of money or other economic advantage to induce third
persons to break a contract with the plaintiff was restrained in the fol-

owing cases: Lumley v. Wagner, i DeG. M. and G. 6o4, 1852; American Base Ball Asso. v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. C. 232, i89o; Standard Fashion
Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157 N. Y. 6o, 1898; American Law Book Co. v.
Ed. Thompson Co., 84 N. Y. Supl. 225, 1903. In the last case cited
the defendants were restrained from offering to indemnify third
persons from any action which might be brought by the plaintiff against

them for breach of contract. To threaten third persons with economic
pressure-that is, business harm-unless they broke their contracts with
the plaintiff was restrained in Beattie v. Callanan, 81 N. Y. Supl. 413,
1903; and threats of violence for the same purpose were restrained in
Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636, z9o3.
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In the cases cited the obligation which the defendant persuaded the third person to break was a contract with the
plaintiff, but Judge Taft, in Toledo, Ann Arbor and Northern Michigan Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Company,3 5 applied the principle to a case where the obligation which the defendant was persuading the third person to
break was one arising under that clause of the Interstate
Commerce Act which obliges a carrier to receive freight
coming .from another state delivered to it by another carrier.3 6
The remaining count in Walker v. Cronin raised a more
difficult question and is treated at greater length by the court.
It charged that the defendants wilfully and without justifiable cause persuaded and induced a large number of persons in the employ of the plaintiffs and others who were
about to enter their employment to leave and abandon their
employment. In this count, which is also sustained by the
court, no contract between the plaintiff and those persuaded
to leave is mentioned, neither is the method of persuasion
referred to. We have in the opinion of Justice Wells a
distinct theory of the proper test of liability in tort for the
harmful consequences of an act. The theory is that he who
wilfully acts so as to cause harm to another is liable for that
harm unless he can show a legal excuse.3 7 In the discussion
0 s4 Fed. 730, 1893.

"Compare Toledo A. A. and North Michigan Ry. Co. v. Penna. Ry.
Co., 54 Fed. 746, 1893. The recent case of Carroll v. Chesapeake and
Ohio Coal Agency Co., x24 Fed. 305, C. C. A. 19o3, is an example of a
further and perhaps questionable extension of the principle of Lumley
v. Gye. The plaintiff was a New Jersey corporation. It entered into
a contract with a coal company of West Virginia by which the coal
company agreed to mine and furnish coal. The membefs of a trade
union, of which some of the defendants were officers, were, so the bill
alleged, by threats preventing those who were desirous of working for
the coal company from doing so, and thus prevented the coal company
from fulfilling its contract with the plaintiff. The court held that the
plaintiff had on the facts alleged a right to bring the bill because of its
interest in the contract with the coal company. The case would appear
to stand for the proposition that if A has a contract with B, any act of
C's which prevents B from fulfilling his contract with A is ,primefacie
a civil wrong to A. Lumley v. Gye and Walker v. Cronin seem to go
no further than to assert that he who for the purpose of harm to A
persuades or forces B to do an act which is a civil wrong to A is liable
resulting from B's act
to A107
forMass.,
the harm
page 562.
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of this count no mention is made of the fact that the persons
persuaded could be considered as the servants of the plaintiff. The case, therefore, may be said to stand for the broad
proposition that he who persuades one person not to deal
with another is liable to that other if damage result unless
he can show a legal excuse. The proposition as stated has
been followed in several trade and labor cases 3 8
The way in which the case of Walker v. Cronin was presented to the court, a demurrer to the allegation that the
persuasion was malicious, prevented the decision throwing
light on the possible character of a legal justification for
such persuasion. The case of the Johnston Harvester Company v. Meinhardt, 9 however, suggests circumstances which
would give the defendant such a justification. In that case
the defendants had been employed by the plaintiff company.
They struck on account of a reduction in the rate of wages.
The defendants, though they did not use any violence, persuaded others from taking their places, and in many cases,
in addition to argument, paid the return railway expenses
of those who had come from a distance to seek employment
with the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for an injunction to
restrain the defendants from interfering with the business of
the company. The bill was dismissed, apparently on the
ground that the defendants were acting within their legal
rights. The case, therefore, in effect holds that one or more
persons, who desire to secure employment with a third, may
persuade by argument or the offer of money others from
taking employment with him without being liable for such
persuasion. The right of strikers in such cases to use peaceful persuasion by argument has been repeatedly affirmed.4 0
'Dickson v. Dickson, 33 La. Ann. 1262, 1881; Delz v. Winfree, 8o
Tex. 400, x8gi; Olive v. Van Patten, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 63o, 1894; Mattison v. Lake Shore and M. S. Ry. Co., 3 Ohio Sup. and C. P. Decs. 526,
1895; Graham v. St. Charles St. R. R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 21A. 1895,
Ertz v. Produce Exchange, 79 Minn. 140, 1900; Moran v. Dunphy,217;
177
Mass. 485, i9o.
Compare further in accord, Thomas v. Cincinnati,
N. 0. and T. P.Ry.Co. 62 Fed. 8o3, 1894 .
"6o How. Pr., 168 N. V. x88o.
"Rogers v. Evarts, i7 N. Y. Supl. 264, x891 (but see the affirming

opinion in z44 N. Y. i89, 1894) ; Sinsheimerv. United Garment Workers,
77 Hun. 215, X. Y. Sup., x894; Standard Tube and Forkside Co. Works
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Their right to pay the return fare of those coming from a
distance to take their former places, though doubted in one
case, has also been recognized. 41 In accord with these cases
it has been held in Pennsylvania that an employer may send
the names of persons who have left his employ on strike
to other employers, requesting them not to employ the
strikers until the trouble is settled, without being liable to
the strikers for the consequent loss of employment. 42 Again,
it has been held that an association of jobbers may persuade
by argument manufacturers to sell only to those jobbers and
retailers who will agree to maintain, in sales to the retailers
and consumers, the price designated by the manufacturers,
the whole trade having been much disturbed by the cutting
of prices by jobbers and retailers.43
If the case of the Johnson Harvester Company illustrates what would be a sufficient legal excuse for persuading
a third person to leave the employment or refrain from
entering the employment of another, that of Thomas v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company 4 illustrates circumstances which were regarded as
negativing any defence for such persuasion which the
v. International Union of Bicycle Workers, 9 Ohio Dec. 692, z899;
Kerbs v. Rosenstein, 67 N. Y. Supl. 385, goo; Foster v. Retail Clerks'
International Protective Association, 78 N. Y. Supl. 86o, i9o2; W.
& A. Fletcher Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 55 A.
o77, N. J. 19o 3. Compare in accord dicta in the following cases:
United States v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748, 1885; 750; Consolidated Steel and
Wire Co. v. Murray, 8o Fed. 811, 1897, 828; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mas&
19oo; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 39D3, 92.
"Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supl. 264, z89r; Cumberland Glass Mxf.

496,

Co. v. Glass Bottle-Blowers' Asso., 59 N. J. Eq. 49, 1899, 58.
In Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, i9o2, 445, the defendants were
restrained "from using the money of the (defendant) association or
any other money for the purpose of preventing further employees of
the complainants from returning to their work and paying money to
such employees to induce them to leave." The decision is apparently
due to a novel application of the doctrine of liability for enticing
servants which is declared to be in force in New Jersey. The doctrine
grew up as a result of one employer enticing the servants of another
away from him. The fact that the person enticing needed a servant
was no excuse. Here the enticer is another servant, and the purpose
of his enticement is to himself obtain service with the plaintiff.
Bradley v. Piersox, z48 Pa. Son, i89z

"Park & Sons' Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists' Association,
77162
N. Fed.
Y. 1, 1903, aff. 64 N. Y. Supl. 276.
8o3, 1894.
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defendants might otherwise have had. In that case the
defendants, who were officers of a union, were attempting
to persuade the employees of the plaintiff to leave his employ
so that the plaintiff could not fulfil his contract with the
Pullman Company. Judge Taft regarded the persuasion,
under the circumstances, as a civil wrong to the plaintiff.
Another and perhaps more doubtful example of a failure to
show a legal excuse for the persuasion of the employees of
another to strike is found in the case-of the Old Dominion
Steamship Company v. McKenna, 41 where the court held
it a civil wrong to the plaintiffs for the defendants, the
officers of a union, to call the plaintiffs' employees out on
strike to assist the striking employees of the plaintiffs in
another state, the persons ordered to leave being satisfied
with their own terms of employment. If this decision is
not to be regarded as contra to that of the Johnson Harvester Company, it is because the law regards one who interferes in the business relations of a man and his employer
for his own benefit more leniently than when he interferes
for the benefit of some third person.
The cases just discussed raise the question whether one
person may interfere with another's business by persuading by argument and offers of money his employees to
leave him without being liable to that other for the harm
which his persuasion has caused? The case of Heywood v.
Tillson,46 which came before the Supreme Court of Maine
in 1883, was the first to raise the question whether an
employer may, by his rules of employment, dictate the
relations between his employees and third persons without
becoming liable for the harm to such third person which is
the natural result of the rules which he has prescribed for
his employees. In the case referred to the plaintiff owned
a house on an island. This island was the property of
the defendant, who operated stone quarries. One of the
employees of the defendant occupied the plaintiff's house and
paid him rent. Without violating any contract with the
30 Fed. 48, 1887.

"75 Me.

225,

1883.
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plaintiff the occupier could leave the house at any time. The
defendant told the occupier that if he continued to occupy
the plaintiff's house he would discharge him. In consequence of this threat the occupier left the plaintiff's house
and the plaintiff could not, owing to the fact that the plaintiff was the sole employer of labor on the island, secure
another tenant. The plaintiff sued at law to recover damages. The court, though there are three opinions, found
unanimously for the defendant. The case, like Bowen v.
Matheson, is really a case of boycott. Economic pressure
-the threat of discharge-had been brought to bear by
the defendant on third persons, his employees, to make such
third persons act in a way harmful to the plaintiff. It is
also a trade boycott in the sense that it is a boycott of one
trader by another trader. It differs, however, from Bowen
v. Matheson in that the persons against whom the pressure
is brought are employees of the defendant, not merely persons with whom he deals as a trader. The case stands for
the proposition that this kind of a trade boycott is legal.
Each of the opinions places the decision on the ground
that, irrespective of the plaintiff's motive or purpose, as
an employer he had an absolute right to prescribe any rules
he saw fit in regard to the persons whom he employed. This
broad proposition would at first seem in conflict with the
assumption in Walker v. Cronin, that he who wilfully acts
so as to harm another is liable for that harm unless he has
a legal excuse. It may be asked, If in Heywood v. Tillson
the plaintiff acts as he did, not from a desire to improve the
morals or efficiency of his employees, but from a wanton
desire to harm the plaintiff, where is his excuse? The
answer is, that perhaps in some cases the excuse may lie in
the absolute right of the defendant to do what he has done,
meaning by "absolute right" the right to do the act under all
circumstances and from whatever motive without being liable
to anyone for the harm naturally resulting. The possibility
of the existence of such absolute rights is admitted by Justice
Wells in Walker v. Cronin.47 It cannot be denied, however,
"Io7 Mass. 564.
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that the spirit of the opinions in Heywood v. Tillson in their
emphasis on absolute right is against that of Justice Wells
in the Massachusetts case, with his emphasis on the defendant's liability, when he has wilfully caused the harm of
which the plaintiff complains, unless he shows a legal excuse.
The case of Heywood v. Tillson has been followed in Tennessee in Payne v. Western and Atlantic Railroad Company.4
In this case the question was the sufficiency of a declaration
stating that the plaintiff was the owner of a store doing a
good business, and the defendants, maliciously conspiring and
confederating together, out of malice, ill-will, and wicked feeling, to break up, injure, damage, and ruin the plaintiff in his
business, caused to be published an order that any employee
who traded with the plaintiff would be discharged. The
court sustained the demurrer. Again the absolute right of
the defendant to do what he did irrespective of its consequences to the plaintiff is emphasized. "Men must be left,"
says Judge Ingersoll, "without interference to discharge or
retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or
even for a bad cause, without thereby being guilty of an
unlawful act Per se." 49 A demurrer to a practically identical statement was, however, overruled by the Texas Court
of Civil Appeal 50 and by the Supreme Court of Louisiana."'
That an employer may make rules for the guidance of his
employees where such rules have some relation to the possible improvement of their service to him, even though
such rules adversely affect the business of third persons,
without being liable to such third persons, can hardly be
questioned. The Texas and Louisiana cases do not throw
any doubt on this. The Texas court expressly points out
that "the petition excludes the idea that the action complained of was taken for any legitimate purpose." 52 But
the absolute right of an employer to influence, through his
"13 Lea. 507, Tenn., 1884.

"Page 5o8.

"International and Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Greenwood, 2 Texas
Civ. App. 76, 1893.
" Graham v. St. Charles Street R. R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 214, z895.

'Page 8r.
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rules of employment, the action of his employees towards
third persons may be regarded as open to doubt.
It is interesting to note that the earliest trade and labor
cases in this country are not cases in which the defendants
are alleged by the plaintiff to have used violence to prevent
third persons from working for him or from becoming his
customers. That violence to a man's employees or customers
for the purpose of driving them away from him gives him a
good cause of action has long been admitted. In the case of
Garrettv. Taylor,5" a case decided in i62o, it was held that
a stonemason could bring an action against one who drove
away his workmen by threats of violence. Lord Holt as
early as 1707, in the case of Keeble v. Hickeringil," says:
"But suppose, Mr. Hickeringill, that if one should lie in the
way with guns, and fright the boys from going to school,
and their parents would not let them go thither, sure that
schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his scholars."55 The right of the plaintiff in such cases does not arise
from the loss of the services of the servant, but from the
obstruction to the business. That the defendant injured the
plaintiff's employee is not enough. He must have known he
was the plaintiff's employee and injured him for the purpose
of ?nnoying the plaintiff.5 8 The judges in the recent cases
arising out of controversies between capital and labor, where
the defendants used violence or the threat of violence to the
employees or customers of the plaintiff, usually assume the
liability of the defendants, the opinions merely dealing with
the propriety of the equitable remedy of injunction. The
earliest case, however, United States v. Kane,5 7 came before
the court, not as an original bill for an injunction, but on the
motion of a receiver of a railroad appointed by the court to
commit the defendants for contempt of court in hindering
the operation of the road by persuading the employees of the
"Croke, James, 567,

i62o.

note
1. from the Year Books in support of the asserHe East.
cites 574,
several
cases
tion that "Action upon the case lies against one that shall by threats
fright away his tenants at will." 9 H. 7, 8 appears to support this assertion. See also the writ given Rostal, 662.
Taylor v. Neri, x Esp. 386, z795.
9123 Fed. 748, 1885.
.i
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receiver through threats of violence not to obey his, the
receiver's, orders in reference to running engines. Justice
Brewer committed the defendants to jail. The case stands
f6r the proposition that where a railroad or other property
is in the custody of a receiver appointed by the court it is a
contempt of court to do any act which would be tortious if
the receiver had been the owner of the property, provided the
act interrupts the receiver in his management of the property. An action similar to that taken by Justice Brewer in
this case was taken by him in the case of In re Doolittle,5"
occurring about the same time. Similar commitments for
contempt have since been made in at least two cases. 59 No

case has thrown any doubt on the correctness of the procedure. It certainly may be defended as a logical application of the old English Chancery practice of committing anyone for contempt who married a ward of Chancery without
the consent of the Chancellor. At the same time the obstruction of a servant of an officer of a court, not in the presence of
the court, in carrying out an order not of the court but of the
officer in discharging his duty to the court, can never be more
than constructively a contempt of the court itself. In view
of the great amount of property which is under the control
of receivers, the case of United States v. Kane was a vast
practical extension of the field of possible constructive contempts. The writer cannot but feel that, in view of the right
of a receiver, situated as the receiver in United States v.
Kane, to apply for an injunction to restrain tortious interference with his employees while in the discharge of their
duties, that it is an unnecessary extension, fraught with possibilities of mischief.
The question whether a court of equity will, at the instance
of an employer, restrain outsiders from trespassing on his
property for the purpose of intimidating his workmen, first
arose in 1887 in the case of New York, Lake Erie and
Western Railrnad Company v. Wenger.6 ° The equitable
"23 Fed. 54, i88S.
"In re Wabash R. Co., 24 Fed. 217, 1885; Thomas v. Cincinnati,N. 0.
and T. P. Ry.Co., 62 Fed. 803, 1894.

a9 Ohio Dec. Rept. 815, z887.
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jurisdiction was affirmed. The next year the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, in Sherry v. Perkins,"' followed the decision if not the reasoning of Vice-Chancellor Malins in the
English case of Springhead Company v. Riley,6 2 and restrained the publication of notices and banners, not in themselves libellous, but which were part of a scheme through
threats of violence to persuade third persons from seeking
employment with the plaintiff. The same year, in Pennsylvania, in the case of Brace Brothers v. Evans,63 the court
issued an injunction to restrain the defendant-from interrupting the plaintiffs' business by persistently annoying and
intimidating their customers. These decisions have since
been followed in a large number of cases, and the jurisdiction
of a court of equity to restrain all forms of violence or
threats of violence to a person's employees or customers is
now as well settled as the fact that such violence is a civil
wrong to the plaintiff.6 4 The objection often made in these
cases, that violence is a crime and a court of equity has no
147 Mass. 212, 1888.
'L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 551, 1868.
I8 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 399, 1888.
See Caur d'Alene Consolidated Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 51
Fed. 26o, 1892; Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. 595, 1893; Blindell v.
Hagan, 54 Fed. 40, 1893; Lake Erie and W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 61 Fed.
494, 1893; Wick China Co. v. Brown, 164 Pa. 449, 1894; Davis v. Zimmerman, 91 Hun. 489, N. Y. Sup. 1895; Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.
Saxey, 131 Mo. 212, I895; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, i896;
Mackall v. Ratchford, 82 Fed. 41, 1897; Cook v. Dolan, 6 Dist. R. 524

Pa. C. P., 1897; O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 238, 1897; American Steel
and Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' and Die Makers' Union, go Fed. 6o8,
1898, 617, 618; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union, 4 L. R. A. 407,
Mich., 1898, 419; Cumberland Glass Mnf. Co. v. Glass Bottle-Blowers'
Asso., 59 N. J. Eq. 49, 1899; Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union, i1o Fed.
698, igoi; Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, ir Fed. 49,
xgOr, 58; Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, ini Fed. 264, 19o1;
Reinecke Coal Min. Co. v. Wood, 112 Fed. 477, i9O1; Herzog v. Fitzgerald, 74 N. Y. App. i1O, 1902; Beaton v. Tarrant, io2 Ill. App. 124,
.92;

United States ex rel. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Haggerty, 116 Fed.

51o, 19o2; Ex parte Richards, 117 Fed. 658, 19o2; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Ruef, 12o Fed. 119, i9o2, 129; Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, i9o2,
445; Jersey City PrintingCo. v. Cassidy, 53 AtI. 230 N. J., 1902; W. P.
Davis Mach. Co. v. Robinson, 84 N. Y. Supl. 837, 1903; Christensen v.
Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Co., nto Ill. App. 61, 1903; Horse-

shoers' Protective Asso. v. Quinlivan, 83 N. Y. App. 459, 1903; W. & A.
Fletcher Co. v. InternationalAsso. of Machinists, 55 A. io77, N. J. Eq.,
i9o3; Underhill v. Murphy, 78 S. W. 482, Ky., 19o4.
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jurisdiction to restrain a crime, has been either disregarded,
or met with the reply that equity takes jurisdiction, not be-

cause the act is a crime, but in spite of it, to protect property.
To the constitutional objection that the injunction deprives
the alleged criminal of a trial by jury it has been replied

that if the violence is committed after notice of the injunction, the defendant is not put in prison for the crime, but
for contempt of the order of the court, and that to deprive
the court on constitutional grounds Qf the right to protect
property by injunction where the wrongful act restrained
was a crime, would be to assert that a man had a constituIn Ex parte Haggerty, 124 Fed. 44r, I9mo, the court thought that a
mortgagee of the mining plant of the employer had sufficient interest to
file the bill. Sed quare if physical damage was not threatened to the
property.
In Beck v. Teamsters' Protective Union, ii8 Mich. 497, z898, the
defendants, as part of a scheme to intimidate the customers of the
plaintiff, issued certain written statements, which statements were also
libels on the plaintiff. The court restrained the publication. See page
527. In this case, as in several other cases, the court of equity restrains
a written publication. It has frequently been objected that this is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. That equity has not
power, unless the power is, as in England under the Judicature Act,
expressly conferred by statute, to restrain a libel is admitted. But a
single act, like publishing to the world a written or printed sentence,
may cause harm in several different ways, and each way in which the
act causes harm may be a distinct tort. Thus the writing in Beck v.
Teamsters' Protective Union has a libel in that by false statements it
held the plaintiff up to the contempt of mankind. But the publication
was so worded that it also intimated to those who read it that the
publishers would see to it that harm would result to those who dealt
with the plaintiff. In short, the act of publication was an act in furtherance of a boycott or illegal interference between the plaintiff and those
with whom he dealt. Equity had jurisdiction to restrain the illegal
interference in business, but no jurisdiction to restrain the libel. In
restraining the publication the court takes the position that where an
act amounts to a tort which equity has jurisdiction to restrain, the mere
fact that the act is also a libel over which equity has no jurisdiction does
not deprive equity of its jurisdiction. This position was not new. It
had already been taken in Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 1888, 214;
Casey v. Cincinnati Typo. Union, 45 Fed. 135, i89r, 144, 145; Ceur
d'Alene Consolidated Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. 26o, 1892,
267. Compare Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46, i888, 50.
It has been held, however, that in order to secure the injunction the
plaintiff must be a trader, and that a beneficial society has not sufficient
interest in its employees to have them protected by an injunction from

threats of physical harm: Atkins v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 55 A. 1074,
N. J. 1903. Sed quare. Compare dissenting opinion of Ingraham, J.,
in Horseshoers'Protective Asso. v. Quinlivan, 83 N. Y. App. 439, 1903,
464, and the decision in Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. x79, 1873.
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tional right to commit a crime in order that he might enjoy
65
the inestimable privilege of trial by jury.
in Bowen v. Matheson 1o the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, as we have already seen, held that no action lay for
harm the result of a boycott. In that case, however, the boycott was instituted by the plaintiffs' rivals in trade for the
purpose of advancing their trade at the expense of the defendants. In 189o tl'e first boycott case in which the defendants
were laborers and ex-employees of the plaintiff and the
friends of such employees came before Judge Taft, who
was then sitting in the Superior Court of Cincinnati. The
case is that of Moores v. The Bricklayers' Union.6 7 The
defendants, who were bricklayers, were members of a union,
one of the objects of which was the improvement of their condition by united action on the subject of wages. The union
requested the plaintiffs, who were contracting bricklayers,
to pay a fine imposed by the union upon one of their employees who was a member of the union, and to reinstate an
apprentice who had left, and discharge another apprentice.
The plaintiffs refused. The defendants sent letters to the
plaintiffs' customers, saying that members of the union would
not work on material supplied by the plaintiffs. The threat
was effective. Judge Taft held the defendants' acts illegal,
approaching the subject from the same general point of view
as Walker v. Cronin. The boycott harmed the plaintiffs and
the defendants had in their motive or purpose no just cause
or excuse. The case decides that a boycott for the purpose
of punishing an employer for not obeying a rule of a union,
and through that punishment deter other employers from
violating the rule, is illegal and actionable if barm results.
The case was a case at law. The more recent English cases
For a full discussion of this question see Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.
v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212, x895, 220. Compare, in accord, the opinion of
Beatty, J., in Caur d'Alene ConsolidatedMining Co. v. Miners' Union,
51 Fed. 26o, 1892, 264-5; of Wood, J., in United States v. Debs, 64 Fed.
724, 1894; of Brewer, j., in In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, z894, 593-4. See
also Toledo A. A. and N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730,
1893, 739; Lake Erie and Western Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 6x Fed. 494, 1893;
Consolidated Steel and Wire Co. v. Murray, 8o Fed. 8x, 1897, 827.

"6
MaSs. 499, 1867.
"23 Ohio Wk. Bul. 48, i89o.
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of Temperton v. Russell 67a and Quinn v. Leathem 68 are
similar, and the decisions are in accord with Judge Taft's
decision.
In the following year another case involving the legality
of a boycott came before the Federal Court in Cincinnati.
This is the case of Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical
Union.n9 The plaintiff, the owner of a newspaper, refused
to unionize his office. The defendants, who were officers
of the union, sent letters to those who advertised in the plaintiff's paper, warning the advertiser that if they continued
their advertisements in the paper the writers would induce
all persons connected with organized labor to cease to deal
with them. The threat was effective. The court issued an
injunction against the continued circulation of the circulars.
The case not only stands for the proposition that an illegal
boycott can be restrained by a court of equity, but that the
desire of a union to harm an employer of labor because he
has refused to enter into direct business relations with it, is
no excuse for persuading by means of threat of business
harm the employer's customers to leave him. Judge Sage
in his opinion goes further than this, practically taking the
position that all boycotts are illegal irrespective of the purpose
of the defendants. He says: "Instead of fair although
sharp and bitter competition, as is contended by counsel, it
was an attempt by coercion to destroy all competition affecting the union, * * * and. allow it to regulate prices
for him, and determine whom he should employ, and whom
discharge."7 0 The case of 'Caseyv. CincinnatiTypographical
Union has been followed in two cases presenting identical
facts, Barr v. Essex Trades Council7 1 and Mathews v.

"a (x893) i

Q. B. 715.

t (19oi) A. C. 495. This case differs slightly from any other case on
either side of the Atlantic. The economic pressure used was the threat
to withdraw from the service of the customers of the plaintiff if those
customers continued to deal with the plaintiff. In the other cases the
defendants were customers of the customers of the plaintiff, not
employees of the customers of the plaintiff.
"4 " Fed. 135, 189i.
"Page 143.
53 N. J. Eq. ioi, 1894.
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Shankland.72 In the former case the theory of injury without excuse is emphasized.73 In Matthews v. Shankland, as
in Casey v. The Cincinnati Typographical Union, the element of coercion in the act itself, the boycott or attempt to
bring economic pressure on third persons, seems to have
been, in the opinion of the court, the essence of the offence. 74
Another boycott case is Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co.75 The
plaintiff company was engaged in making barrels and casks.
They introduced into their establishment a new hooping
machine, which apparently enabled them to do away with a
number of their employees. These employees were members
of a union known as the Coopers' International Union of
North America. There was a certain affiliation between this
union and other unions, members of what was known as the
Trades Assembly of Kansas City. Representatives of these
bodies notified the plaintiff company that they would establish a boycott against the company if they continued to use
the hooping machine, and in the prosecution of this boycott
would notify all persons using the plaintiffs' barrels and
casks that the members of the unions, consisting of a large
number of persons in all parts of the United States, would
refuse to buy any goods packed in barrels or casks made by
the company. The plaintiffs asked and obtained an injunction restraining the defendants, the officers of the associations,
putting in force this threatened boycott. The illegality of the
contemplated acts, in the mind of Judge Thayer, who delivered the opinion, is primarily the unlawful interference in
the plaintiffs' right to conduct their business as they see fit,
and the unlawfulness of the interference depends, as in
' 56 N. Y. Supl. 123, 1898.

See also Gray v. Building Trades Council, 97 N. W. 663, Minn., 1903,.
for a case in which the defendants instituted a boycott against the
plaintiff for the apparent purpose of punishing the plaintiff for not running his business in the way desired by a union of employees of the

trade in which the plaintiff was engaged. The boycott was restrained.
In accord: Martin v. McFall, 55 A. 465, N. J., i903.

Pages 117, I18.
Page 28. In Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 1894,
an injunction to restrain an alleged boycott similar to that in Casey v.
Cincinnati Typ. Union was denied because the facts failed to show
such a persistent persecution of the plaintiff as to warrant an injunction.
" 83 Fed. 912, C. C. A., 1897, aff. Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers' Int.
Union, 72 Fed. 695, 1896.
U
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Casey v. Typographical Union, on the element of coercion.
"The customers of the plaintiffs are," he says, "compelled
to surrender their freedom of action." The dissent of Judge
Caldwell, the only dissent in what we may call labor boycott
cases, is based on the.opinion that as each of the members of
the defendant associations had a right to deal or not to deal
with whom they chose, they had a right to refuse to deal
with the plaintiffs' customers because they used the plaintiffs'
barrels, and that there was not a conspiracy, because there
was not an agreement among the defendants to do an unlawful act. Under the facts of the case we may regard the court
as at least deciding that defendants cannot escape liability
for the harm resulting from their boycott of the plaintiff by
showing that they are members of a union and that their
purpose in instituting the boycott was to compel the plaintiff
to refrain from adopting a particular machine which they,
the defendants, believed to be inimical to the interests of the
plaintiffs' employees.
Comparing these labor boycott cases with the trade boycott cases, we find that the question whether a boycott of
one trader by rival traders is legal is a question in which
there is a conflict of authority, but a boycott of a trader
by laborers or others who are not rival traders has invariably been held illegal. The same line of distinction has
been followed in England.76 The only justification for the
distinction lies in the fact that in the labor boycott cases
the connection between the acts of the defendants and their
own advancement is sometimes one degree more remote than
in the boycott by rival traders. In the trade cases the immediate purpose of the defendants is usually to establish a
monopoly through which their own economic advancement is
to be secured. In the labor cases the immediate purpose is
"1Compare Temperton v. Russell (1893), I Q. B. 715, a boycott by

laborers, with Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. 598, aff. in
(1892) A. C. 25, where the defendants, being rival traders of the plain-

tiffs, refused to take freight from shipping agents who dealt with the
plaintiffs. This part of the case is not discussed by the judges. It is
assumed that the plaintiffs are without remedy for the harm resulting
from such acts. See also in accord Scottish Co-operative Society v.
Glasgow Fleshers' Association, 35 Sc. L. R. 645, 1898, and opinion of
Lord Lindley in Quinn v. Leathem (Igoi), A. C. 495, page 539.
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usually to punish the plaintiff, and through the example of
his punishment to make him and others adopt certain rules
in the conduct of business, which rules will in the end be
beneficial to the economic position of the defendants. The
connection between the boycott and the economic advancement being less clear to the judges, there is a tendency to
regard the defendants in labor boycotts as persons who have
intermeddled in the plaintiff's business without excuse. The
distinction, in view of the real facts, is a narrow one, and
the writer does not believe it will stand analysis.. The boycott is an appeal to force, not an appeal to reason. The force
is not physical force, but is none the less an attempt to coerce
the will of third persons, so that they will act in a way prejudicial to the plaintiffs' interests. The purpose of selfadvancement in business or trade is one to be encouraged
by the law, but it should not be sufficient to excuse harm to
others through the coercion of their customers. This conclusion is a criticism, not of the labor boycott cases, but of
such decisions as Bowen v. Matheson, which have held a
boycott undertaken by the rivals in business of the person
boycotted as legal.
In the boycott cases just discussed, as in the earlier case
of Bowen v. Matheson, the person boycotted was a trader,
using the word trader in its broad sense as including those
whio make and sell goods as well as those who merely sell.
The harm of which the plaintiff complains in this class of
cases is an injury to his trade. He has been deprived of a
market for the sale of his goods. The case of Lucke v. The
Clothing Cutters' Union,7 7 decided by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland in 1893, seems to have been the first case not
affected by statute in which the boycott was directed by
workmen against a workman for the purpose of depriving
him of a market for his labor.78 The plaintiff was a cutter
n77

Md. 396, 1893.

The case of Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-Cutters' Association, 47 N.
EV.s5g, iSgo, is an earlier case, but that was decided under a statute.
he New Jersey Act of 1883, Supp. Rev., page 774, par. 3o, provides
that "it shall not be unlawful for any two or three persons to unite,
combine, etc., to persuade, advise or encourage by peaceable means any
person or persons to enter into any combination for or against leaving
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in the employ of Rosenfield Brothers; the defendant an
incorporated labor union. Rosenfield Brothers had every
desire to retain the plaintiff in their employ, though they
were under no contract to do so, when they received a
letter from the secretary of the union stating that unless
they discharged the plaintiff their shop would be declared a
non-union shop. Solely in consequence of the receipt of this
letter Rosenfield Brothers discharged the plaintiff. Had
they not done so all persons connected with organized labor
would have refused to buy their goods, and their other
laborers, who were members of the union, would have been
ordered out by the organization. The court was of opinion
that these facts constituted a cause of action; in other
words, that what we may call the fellow-workman boycott is
illegal or actionable if harm results. It will be noted that
the purpose of the defendants in establishing the boycott
was to obtain a practical monopoly of the labor market in the
cutting trade in the city. Through this monopoly they
intended to improve their economic position as workers.
The case decides that it is actionable for two or more persons, workers in a particular trade, in order to obtain a
monopoly of the work in that trade for themselves, to
threaten to leave or leave the employment of anyone who
employs another, provided that other is actually deprived
of employment as a result of acts done in pursuance of the
or entering into the employment of any person or persons or corporation." Vice-Chancellor Green held that under this act a number of
laborers could combine to leave their employment if the employer hired
any non-union man, and the refusal of an employer to employ a
non-union man because of this threat did not give the non-union man
a cause of action against the members of the union. Whether this
case is now law in the jurisdiction, though the statute has not been
repealed, may be regarded as doubtful. Vice-Chancellor Green declared
in Barrv. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. ioi, 1894, a case of the boycott of a trader by laborers, that a boycott if resulting in harm was actionable, and that he had decided the earlier case as he did because of the
statute. But in the more recent case of Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq.
443, i902, Vice-Chancellor Pitney declares that the Act of 1883 "renders
innocent, as against the public, an act which, previous to its passage,
was a misdemeanor and punishable by indictment." "It does not," he
adds, "take away or in any wise affect any private rights which may
arise out of the acts which are legalized by that legislation," pages 447-8.

He furthermore intimates that if the Act of 1883 affected private rights
it is unconstitutional:

TRADE AND

LABOR DISPUTES.

combination. The case has been followed in Plant v.
Woods,7 9 a Massachusetts case, and Erdman v. Mitchell,s° a
Pennsylvania case. Both of these cases, being cases in
equity, stand for the further proposition, that a Court of
Chancery has jurisdiction to restrain by injunction such a
boycott.8 1 Justice Holmes dissented in Plant v. Woods. He
believed that the monopoly of the labor market of one trade
by one union was a means by which the rate of wages in
that trade could be materially advanced, and he thought
that the purpose of the defendants in desiring a monopoly
being justified by this fact, gave them a legal excuse for the
harm which their acts inflicted on the defendants.8s2 The
courts in New York have also taken a position in regard to
these fellow-labor boycotts which is at variance with that
adopted in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania."8
The first case in that State in which the opinion is expressed
that a laborer, boycotted by his fellow-laborers, has suffered
no legal injury is Davis v. United PortableHoisting Engineers.84 In that case the plaintiff, who was a hod-hoisting
engineer, asked that the defendants, the officers and members
of a union, be restrained from in any manner preventing
the plaintiff from obtaining employment. In the opinion
of the majority of the court the plaintiff failed to'show
that he had ever been discharged as a result of the acts
of the defendants. The only employer testifying in the
case swore that he had only employed the plaintiff until he
could obtain a union man, not that he had discharged him
because of the threats of the union. Judge Patterson, however, does say: "There can be no doubt that members
176 Mass. 492, 1900.
"2o7 Pa. 79, 1903. It was also followed in New York in the case
of Curran v. Galen, i52 N. Y. 33, 1897. This case has, apparently, been
overruled by the case of National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, i7o
N. Y. 316, i9o2, see infra.
k To the same effect see the English case of Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union [I9o3], 2 K. B. 6oo, Ct. of App.
Page 505.
= There is also a case in the Appellate Court of Indiana, Clemmitt v.
Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38, 1895, which is contra to Lucke v. Clothing
Cutters' Union. But see Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592, 1893.
"28 App. Div. 396, N. Y., 1898.
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of trade unions, as well as other individuals, have a right
to say that they will not work with persons who do not
belong to their organizations, and whether they say it
themselves or through their organized societies makes no
difference. They have a right by that method to secure
employment for their own members." s5 Judge Rumsey
dissented, because he believed that the coercion exercised by
the defendants had caused the plaintiff's discharge, and that
this coercion for the purpose of depriving another of employment was unlawful.8 0 Following the opinion of Judge Patterson, if not the actual decision in this case, the special
term of the Supreme Court in Tallnum v. Gallard T refused
to issue an injunction pendente lite in a case in which the
plaintiff set out that he had been discharged because of the
threats of the defendants that unless his employer discharged him the defendants would bring on a general strike
of the other employees. Judge Giegerich, quoting the sentence we have given from Judge Patterson's opinion in Davis
v. Engineers, says: "Applying the foregoing principles to
the case at bar, it is clear that the means used by the defendants were lawful." The same judge took a similar action
in Reform Club of Masons and Plasterersv. Laborers' Union
Protective Society.s8 The Court of Appeals, though by a
'399.
"Page 399. He regards the English case of Allen v. Flood (I898),
A. C. i,as having been decided on similar facts and as holding that one
man is not liable to another, though he has caused that other's discharge
by economic pressure on his employer. Judge Rumsey regards the
English decision as erroneous. He was mistaken, however, in the nature
of the decision in Allen v. Flood. Though the question discussed in
our text was discussed in that case, under the view of the facts adopted
by the majority of the House of Lords, the case merely stands for the
obvious legal rule that a man who has not caused the discharge of
another from his employment is not liable for the harm to him resulting
Irom such discharge. See statements by members of the House in
Quinn v. Leathem (igoI), A. C 495. The lower courts in England,
when the decision in Allen v. Flood was first announced, interpreted
it in the same manner as Judge Rumsey. See Huttley v. Simmons
(x898), 1 Q. B. 181, also the modification made in the injunction issued
in Lyons v. Wilkins, 78 L. T. Rep. 618, x898, s. c. 67 L.J.Ch. 383.
S757 N. Y. Supl. 419, x899. This decision and the opinion of Patterson,
Y., in Davis v. United Portable Hoisting Engineers, 28 App. Div. 396,
1898, 397, just quoted, appears to be contra to the earlier New York
case of Curranv. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 1897.
"6o N. Y. Supl. 388, x899.
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divided court, confirmed these cases in National Protective
Association of Stean-fitters and Helpers v. Cumming.89 In
this case one McQueed was president of the plaintiff association, an incorporated labor union. He brought the action
for himself and the other members of his union against the
officers and members of several allied unions connected
with steam work in the erection of buildings, and probably
with other building-trade unions. The complaint alleged
that the defendants were empowered to go rQund to the
different buildings in which their members were employed,
and if they found any non-members working on the building, to demand their discharge. That one of the members of
the plaintiff corporation was engaged on a building when the
defendants caused his discharge by threatening, that unless
he was discharged they would order a strike of the members
of the organizations they represented who were working on
the building. Chief-Justice Parker, who wrote the opinion
of the court, rests his decision on the absolute right of a
man or body of men to work or not to work. From this
principle it of course follows that the defendants in the case
before him had a right to threaten to do what they had
an absolute right to do. It will be noted that the basis of this
decision in favor of the defendants is radically different from
that expressed by Justice Holmes in Plantv. Woods. Justice
Holmes starts with the proposition that to wilfully act so as
to cause harm toanother gives that other a right of action.
He then finds in the purpose of the defendant a legal privilege or excuse. Justice Parker, on the other hand, lays
emphasis on the existence of absolute rights and expressly
disapproves of the growing tendency to regard motive or
purpose as an element tending to determine the legal character of an act.90 The dissenting opinion of Justice Vann
expresses still another way of deciding the question at issue.
To him, as to Judge Sage in Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union,"' the element of coercion is the factor
which makes the defendants' acts unlawful.
7xo N. Y. 315, igo2, aff, 53 App. Div. 227, 9oo.
"Page 326.
45 Fed. 135, i89r, note 69.
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The same conflict of opinion which appears to exist in
these cases where laborers attempt to boycott laborers, also
appears in the two reported cases in which the defendants,
not being laborers, procured the plaintiff's discharge by
bringing economic pressure to bear on his employer. In
Raycroft v. Tayntor 9 2 the plaintiff was employed by a
person who had a license to work a quarry which he had
received from the defendant, the superintendent for the
owner of the quarry. The plaintiff and the defendant quarrelled, and as a result of this quarrel the defendant told
the plaintiff's employer that he would revoke his license
unless he discharged the 'plaintiff. The court held that
the defendant had an absolute right to revoke or threaten
to revoke the license without being liable for the resulting harm to the holder of the license or anyone else. On
the other hand, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in London
Guarantee Company v. Horn,93 seem to come to an opposite conclusion. In this case an insurance company made
a contract with the plaintiff's employer to indemnify the
employer from all loss by reason of claims for damages
from any of his employees injured while in his employ. The
plaintiff was injured and sued his employer. The insurance
company by its contract with the employer became the real
defendant in the suit. The plaintiff refused an offer of settlement on the part of the insurance company, and the latter's
agent told the plaintiff's employer that unless he discharged
him the insurance company would cancel the contract of
insurance. The company had a right to do this on five days'
notice, but whether the threat was to cancel at once or on five
days' notice is doubtful. At any rate, it was effective: the
plaintiff was discharged. The majority of the court held he
had a good cause of action against the insurance company.
Two judges dissented on the ground that the threat of
the insurance company to cancel the contract with the plaintiff's employer was to cancel it in five days, and this they
had an absolute right to do from whatever motive.
"68 Vt. 219, x8g6.
"206 IN. 493, i9o4, aff. rox 'IL. App. 355.
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The method of approaching a question of alleged tort,
which presumes that one is liable for harm which is the
natural consequence of a wilful act, appeals to the writer. A
discussion of the proper method of determining a doubtful
question of torts is not, however, the object of this article.9 4
Assuming the method indicated to be correct, he cannot
think that the desire for self-advancement through securing
the monopoly of the labor market is no more a legal
justification in the fellow-workmen boycott cases than the
desire for self-advanceinent through the monopoly of the
market for particular goods is an excuse for a trade boycott, or the adoption of a rule of employment desired by
a union is an excuse for its members inaugurating a labor
boycott against an employer who will not adopt it, even
though its adoption will probably tend to the economic
advancement of the laborers. In short, the writer believes
that the position that a person should have a civil action for
harm the result of a boycott is sound, and should be generally applied to all the three classes of boycott so far considered. Self-advancement alone should not be a legal excuse for harm the result of a boycott, whether that selfadvancement is worked out indirectly through monopoly or
directly, as in the Illinois case just discussed.
This is not saying, however, that there may not exist
legal justifications for a boycott. An example of a legal
justification is illustrated by the case of the Continental
9" a case decided
Company v. Board of Fire Underwriters,
by Judge, now Justice, McKenna. This was a trade boyc6tt case. The defendants were companies engaged in fire
insurance. They notified their agents that they must cease
to represent the company in the association if they represented the plaintiff company. An injunction to restrain
this threat is denied, though the alleged act of threatening
to refuse to deal with those who insured in the plaintiff
company is declared illegal and restrained.98 It is evident
" The writer has discussed this question in an article on, "The
Closed Market, the Union Shop, and the Common Law," in the April
number of the current volume of the Harvard Law Review.
w67 Fed. 310, 1895.

"Pages 312, 323.
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that there is a legal justification for refusing to deal with
an agent for the sale of one's goods who represents a business rival. 7 An agent is in a different position than a
customer. He is supposed to push the business of his principal. In the insurance business one man may represent
several companies, but whether the fact that he represents
one company is or is not inimical to the interests of a
rival company which he also wants to represent is for the
rival company to determine. The case is not unlike the
case of the employer who determines that for the good
of his business his employees should not deal with a particular store, because dealing with the store tends, in the
opinion of the employer, to adversely affect the character of
his employees as employees. Neither is the case unlike that
of the laborer who refuses to work with another laborer
because he believes him to be incompetent and therefore,
owing to the character of their work, likely to jeopardize his
life or adversely affect the character of his output All
these cases are boycott cases in the sense that economic
pressure is brought on third persons to make them act in a
way harmful to others; but in each case those who inaugurate the boycott have a legal excuse for the harm done to
the boycotted person.
The earliest and the first case which we have discussed,
Hunt v. Simonds,"8 was a case of trade strike; that is,
the united refusal of two or more traders to deal with
a third. It was not, however, until 1892 that a case involving an agreement among several employers not to employ certain workmen came before a court. In Worthington v. Waring 9 the plaintiffs, who were weavers, alleged
that the manufacturers of Fall River had agreed among
themselves not to employ anyone who, being an employee
of one of them, had gone out on strike; that the plaintiffs
had left the defendants' employ on strike, and the defendants had in pursuance of the agreement blacklisted them
and sent their names to other manufacturers in Fall River.
"It may be possible to support the English case of Mogul S. S. Co.
v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598 (1892), A. C. 25, on this ground.
19 Mo. 583, 1854.
U157 Mass.
42r, 892.
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The prayer of the petition was that such blacklists or other
devices used for the purpose of preventing the plaintiffs'
employment be withdrawn and destroyed. What benefit the
plaintiffs could obtain by any possible action of a court of
equity, their names having already been sent to other manufacturers, parties to the agreement, is not clear. The court,
while expressly refraining from dealing with, the question
whether the acts of the defendants constituted a cause of
action, place their refusal to grant relief on the ground that
the plaintiffs are attempting to enforce a mere personal
as distinguished from a property right and that equity only
protects rights of property. This ground, it is submitted, is
hardly tenable. The reasonable expectation of a trader that
he will be able to sell his goods to his old customers has been
protected by courts of equity from the wrongful interference
of third persons on the ground that a man's business reputation is incorporeal property. It would appear that the
laborer's reasonable expectation of securing employment
should, on the same ground, be equally entitled to the Chancellor's protection. A few years after the decision in Worthington v. Waring, the same court in the case of Plant v.
Woods 100 protected by a decree in equity this right against
what they regarded as the wrongful interference of fellowworkmen. Apart from the question of equitable jurisdiction, whether an agreement among several manufacturers
to send each other the names of employees who go out on
strike and to keep a blacklist of the same, is actionable if
harm results to the striker has yet to be expressly decided.'
Judge Rogers in Boyer v. Western Union Telegraph Corn176 Mass. 492, 1900.

IDO

"'In Mattison v. Lake Shore and South Mich. R. R. Co., 3 Ohio, Dec.
Sup. and Com. Pleas, 526, z895, the plaintiff was the discharged employee

of the defendant. He set forth in his declaration that the defendant
maliciously interfered with his rights to earn his living as a railroad
employee by putting in force, certain "blacklists" rules against him; but

he did not explain the nature of these rules, and one is uncertain
whether he sued for a malicious discharge or a malicious persuasion of
others not to employ him. The court overruled the demurrer of the
defendants. In McDonald v. The Illinois Cent. R. R., 187 Ill. 529, goo,
the plaintiff did not allege any agreement not to employ him among

several employers, or that he failed to get employment because of any
action on the part of his old employer. The court sustained the defendant's demurrer.
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pany 102 takes the position that where there is no contract
between an employer and his men he may legally discharge
them for any reason, and inform others, who inquire, the
reason for the discharge. As he furthermore takes the position that there is no such thing as an illegal conspiracy to
do a lawful act," 10s it is probable that he would consider an
agreement among several employers to blacklist particular
workmen as legal. 10 4
The last form of strike, or agreement among several per-.
sons not to deal with another, to come before the civil courts,
was the labor strike, the kind of strike to which the word
itself is usually confined. 10 5 In Arthur v. Oakes,10 6 a Federal case arising in 1894, the receiver of a railroad secured
from the circuit court 10 7 an injunction which Justice Harland thought restrained the employees from quitting the
service of the company in a body. He struck out this part of
the injunction on the express ground that equity has no
jurisdiction to force one man to remain in the personal service of another. Merely the jurisdiction of Chancery, not
the substantive legal rights of the parties, was involved.10 8
Though the question of the liability for the harm done to an
H 124 Fed. 246, 1903. Compare Platt v. Philadelphiaand Reading
R.
R., 65 Fed. 66o, 1894.
" Page248.

In England it has been held that an agreement among several contributors to a fund for the support of a clergyman, to discontinue their
contributions, the purpose of the agreement being to get rid of the clergyman for what they believed to be the good of the parish, did not give
the clergyman a cause of action, though, owing to the action of the
defendants, he was obliged to resign from the parish. Kierney v. Lloyd,
26 L. K Ir.268, 1889.
'"The complainants set out in their bill that they were members of
a union and that the defendants, officers of a company, had conspired
to prevent their obtaining employment. The acts charged, however,
were merely discharging anyone wholistbelonged
a union,
to see ait.list
desiredkeeping
who
to those to
of such persons, and showing such
* The case of Carew v. Rutherford, xo6 Mass. x, i87o, supra, is a case
which grew out of a labor strike, but it will be remembered that the
suit
in that
casemoney
was for
a
strike
for forcing
plaintifffor
by the
means
to pay
of
he damages
did not owe,
not orthe amages
result
of a strike.
I,,63 Fed. 370, C. C A., 7894.
w h report of this case in the circuit court will be found in 6o Fed.
8o3, 78o4 under the name of Farmer; Loan and Trust Co. v. North
Pac. R. R. Co.
u Pages 319, 320.
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employer by a sudden and prearranged cessation of work on
the part of his employees has never come fairly before the
courts, it may be assumed, that if the purpose of the strike is
to improve the economic conditions of the laborers, or has
something to do with their terms of employment, they are
not liable for the resulting harm. Indeed, this assumption
has been frequently made by our courts. 10 9 Whether the
strikers would be liable if their purpose was a purely malicious one is doubtful.' 1 0 ' It depends upon two questions:
First, whether the purpose of an actor should be taken into
consideration in solving questions of alleged tort; and,
second, admitting that purpose should at least in some
cases be taken into consideration, whether the zct of severing the relations of employer and employee by the latter
or by the former should be treated as an act over which the
purpose of the actor could have an effect on his legal liability
for the consequent harm. These are questions which remain
undetermined in our law and on which great confusion
exists."1 The typical case, however, is not the strike with
the malicious purpose, but the strike with the economic purpose; that is, the advancement of what the strikers believe
to be their own interests. This is not only true of the labor
strike, but is also true of the trade strike discussed in the
first part of this article, and the employers' strike which
expresses itself in the blacklist or lockout. It may with a
good deal of confidence be asserted, in spite of the absence
of positive authority on many phases of the proposition, that
two or more persons who agree not to have business relations with a third are never liable to the third person for
the harm resulting if their purpose is their own advance' For an example of such an assumption see Wabash R. R. Co. v.
Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563, 1903, 570. Compare Allis Chalmers Co. v.
Reliable Lodge, iii Fed. 264 N. Y., go, 268.
' Compare the cases in which the courts have stated if they have not
decided that one trader may refuse to deal with another trader irrespective of his purpose or motive.
'The confusion in the trade and labor cases on these questions has
been treated by the author in a recent article in the Columbia Law
Review for February of the present year entitled "Should the Motive
of the Defendant Affect the Question oi His Liability?-The Answer
of One Class of Trade and Labor Cases." 5 Col. Law. Rev. io7.
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ment, unless in severing their relations with him they break
some contract or contracts.
Down to the point which we have now reached in the
development of the law we notice a sharp contrast in the
way in which the law treats a strike and a boycott. The
strike, at least for the purpose of economic advancement, is,
from the point of view of civil law, legal. The boycott, on
the other hand, for the same purpose has usually been considered illegal. Laborers may combine to leave the service
of their employer and he cannot recover from them damages
for the resulting loss to him; but if they leave him in order to
compel him not to deal with a third person, then, though he
may have no action against them, the third person has an
action. Admitting this difference in the legal aspect of a
strike and boycott, the most recent trade and labor cases have
illustrated the difficulty of determining in some instances
whether what looks likes a strike is not in reality a boycott.
In Longshore Printing Company v. Howell,"12 for instance,
a case arising in Oregon in 1894, a union declared a strike
at A's works. Members of the union, employees of A, had
they refused to strike would have been expelled from the
union. If the cessation of labor on the part of all those who
left A's employ was voluntary or merely the result of persuasion by argument all parties admitted that A was not entitled
to have the injunction he asked for to restrain the order to
strike; but, if the order to strike was obeyed by some of the
laborers because of fear of economic harm, then there was,
not merely a strike, but a boycott of the plaintiff. In this
case the court did not think there was enough evidence of
coercion of individual members to warrant their issuing an
injunction. In the New York case of Coons v. Chrystie,11
however, the officers of a union were restrained from declaring a strike at the plaintiff's factory, the court believing that
the employees would not strike unless some form of coercion
accompanied the order. In Wabash Railroad Company v.
Hannahan,"'4the court on similar facts came to an opposite
"26 Ore. _4w, x894.
If 53 N. Y. Supl. 668, i88.
121 Fed. 563, i9o3.
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conclusion.. The mere fact that a number of laborers agree
that they will strike when told to do so by their president or
other officer is not, of course, proof that those who strike
as the result of such an order are coerced. It may merely
indicate that they have determined for their own benefit to
follow the advice of another. Coercion in such cases is a
matter of fact to be determined by ascertaining what would
happen to the individual workman if he refused to obey the
so-called "order to strike.!' If the result to one who refused
to obey would be physical or economic harm, then there is
coercion, if the threat has in fact affected the action of some
of those who leave the plaintiff's employ. In Boutwell v.
Mar, 115 a Vermont case, the same question' arose out of
what was on its surface merely a trade strike. The members
of an association of granite manufacturers composing ninetyfive per cent. of the trade passed a rule that no one should
have his granite polished by a person not a member of the
association on the penalty of a fine of fifty dollars. In consequence of this resolution members of the association
refused to send their granite to A. A sued the members of
the association for a conspiracy to injure, and recovered on
the ground that a boycott exists when unity of action is
secured by threats. The fine of fifty dollars constituted, in
the opinion of the court, such a threat. It may be
presumed that the court thought the persons who had
been sending their granite to the plaintiff refused to do
so because of the threat of the fine, for, of course, a
plaintiff cannot recover on the ground of boycott unless
there is a casual connection between the alleged coercion of
third persons and the harm of which he complains."" The
conclusion from these cases is, that merely calling something
=342 A. 6o7 Vt., ift.
'Thus

in Downes v. Bennett, 63 Kas. 653, igoz, a case similar in all

respects to Boutwedl v. Marr, except that there was no definite sum
mentioned in the rules of the association as a fine for a member dealing
with the plaintiff, the plaintiff asked for an injunction to restrain the
members of the association, by threats of fine or expulsion from the
association, preventing the individual members from dealing with the
plaintiff. The court refused the injunction because the plaintiff failed
to prove that the fine was the cause which induced the members not to
deal with the plaintiff.
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a voluntary cessation of work or trade relations does not
make it voluntary, and if the severence of business relations
is not voluntary on the part of all participating, it may be
treated by the courts, not as a conspiracy to do a lawful actthat is, sever business relations-but a conspiracy among
some of those who strike to do an unlawful act-that is,
coerce others to sever their business relations with the
plaintiff.
Another class of problems in tort arising out of trade
and labor controversies is due to the fact that in some
jurisdictions if A persuades B by argument not to deal with
C this gives C a right to recover from A unless A has a legal
excuse--such, for instance, as a purpose to advance himself.
Where the officers of a labor union have been selected by the
members to tell them when it is for their interest to strike,
they are not liable if, for a purpose germane to their appointment, they order a strike. But suppose the court should think
that the officer of a union urged Cs employees to join his
union merely for the purpose of ordering them to leave C's
employ, then the mere fact that C's employees joined the
union first and struck afterwards does not alter the fact that
a stranger to C and his employees has interfered and persuaded the employees to leave. It is this conception that the
officer of a labor union is an interloper, a conception
which sometimes corresponds with the fact, which causes
such a decision as Old Dominion Steamship Company v.
McKenna,117 where the company recovered in an action at
law against the members of the board of the executive council of a union for persuading the company's employees to
strike.
Another possible class of difficulties arising out of the
rule of law which holds that he who persuades one man
not to deal with another must have a legal excuse, is suggested by a case decided in Minnesota in ioo, Ertz v. Produce Exchange.""' In that case the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants, the members of a produce exchange, conspired
3o Fed. 48, z887.
Minn. 140, 19OO.
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to refuse to deal with him; and one defendant, the produce
exchange, "did maliciously solicit and procure from all
its co-defendants, and each of them, and from many other
persons to the plaintiff unknown, an agreement not to sell
to or buy from the plaintiff." 119 The defendants demurred.
The Supreme Court affirmed the action of the lower court in
overruling this demurrer. It will be noted that the plaintiff
had alleged that the defendants or one of them had persuaded third persons not fo deal with him. The court in
effect takes the position that to persuade a third person not
to deal with another is a civil wrong to that other if harm
results, unless he who persuades has some legal excuse. The
difference between persuading by argument persons to conspire with you not to deal with another and conspiring to
persuade third persons not to deal with another might have
been considered. But the court treat the case as raising the
same kind of a question as the earlier case of Bohn Manufacturing Company v. Holli,' 20 in which there was a mere
agreement between several persons not to deal with the
plaintiff. The two cases are distinguished on the ground,
that in the earlier case the defendants had a legal excuse
in the fact that they were seeking their own economic
advancement, while in the latter the demurrer was in effect
a contention that the defendants did not need any excuse. If
the act of persuading a person not to deal with a third needs
a legal justification, it is immaterial whether the person persuaded is asked to enter into an agreement with the persuader to persuade others. This is the position which is
practically taken by the court in this case. It appeals
strongly to logic and common sense. If correct, however,
it is necessary to explain and qualify the usual assertion,
which as we have seen has been made in many of the trade
and labor cases, 121 namely, that in the law of private wrongs,
there is no such thing as a conspiracy to do a rightful thing.
A may cease to deal with C for a good reason, a bad reason,
or no reason at all, and the law will perhaps give C no
Pages
142,
s4
Nunn.
223,43.1893, mupra.
SSupra, note 9.
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remedy; to maliciously persuade another, however, is quite
another matter. Yet how can we conceive of an agreement between two or more persons not to deal with a third
without supposing that the parties to the agreement or some
of them persuaded the others or each other to enter into it?
It follows, therefore, that while A may not have an action
against B, though B with a malicious purpose refuses to
buy or sell to him, A may have an action against several
who with the same purpose combine to refuse to deal with
him; not because of the combination, but because combination presupposes mutual persuasion for its creation and
continuation. At any rate, one can hardly read the opinion
in Ertz v. Produce Exchange without realizing that the
decision would have been the same even though the plaintiff
had not alleged that the conspirators had persuaded third
persons not in the conspiracy to refuse to deal with him.
In the Johnston Harvester Company v. Meinhardtl' it
was held, as we have seen,'2 that for the purpose of selfadvancement one man may offer money or other advantage
to another to persuade that other from dealing with a third
without being liable to the third person for the resulting
harm. All underselling in the process of competition in
business would be impossible if self-advancement was not
an excuse for the harm done'to a rival trader by underselling. But suppose the underselling is not for any legitimate trade purpose, but merely for the purpose of doing
harm to another? This question came before the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit in the case of Passaic
PrintWorks v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Company.12 ' The
plaintiff set out in his declaration that the defendants were
underselling him, not because they were desirous of advancing their own trade, but for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff's. The demurrer of the defendant was sustained, the
opinion of the court being written by Judge Thayer, who
expressly follows the position apparently adopted by several of the judges in the House of Lords in the case of Allen
"6o How. Pr. x68, N. Y., 8o.
'Supra, page 479.
1 o5 Fed. x63, C. C. A., igoo.
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v. Flood,1 25 that prima facte a lawful act cannot be made
unlawful by the motive which prompted it. Judge Sanborn
dissented because he took the position that as the defendant's act had caused the plaintiff harm, he was liable for that
harm or not according to the purpose with which he acted.
The exact question raised in the case is new, and it will take
several decisions to settle the law. An opinion as to the
correct decision depends on whether the motive or purpose
of the actor should be considered in this class of cases. The
writer believes that it should be considered. This question,
however, he has discussed at length elsewhere.1 26 Whatever
opinion may be had in regard to this disputed question, there
would appear to be no doubt that in a large number of cases
the motive of the actor has determined his liability for the
harmful consequences of his act, and that the general trend
of authority in the trade and labor cases is in favor of the
view taken in the dissenting opinion in PassaicPrintWorks
v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Company.127 In the words of
Lord Coleridge, in speaking of the very question raised later
in the Passaic Print Works case, "It is too late to dispute,
if I desired it, as I do not, that a wrongful and malicious
combination to ruin a man may be ground for such an action
as this.' ' 12s
William Draper Lewis.
"3(1898)
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article in 18 Har. Law Rev. 444, referred to supra, note g4,
and an article in 5 Col. Law Rev. 107, " Should the Motive of the
'The

Defendant Affect the Question of His Liability?"
" See the discussion of Walker v. Cronin, supra, and the article by
Prof. Ames in 18 Harv. Law Rev. 411, referred to supra.
'Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, 21 Q. B. D. 544, 1888, 553.

